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“WAGNER’S LAW” IN ITALY: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM 1960 TO 2008 
by COSIMO MAGAZZINO  
«[…] the fact of believing in a corpus of scientific knowledge acquired independently of any 
judgement of values is, as I consider it to be, a naїve empiricism. […] questions are an expression of our 
interest in matters of the world, they are in essence assessments»1. 
G. K. MYRDAL (1898-1987) 
ABSTRACT: “Wagner’s Law” is the first model of public expenditure in the history of public 
finance. The aim of this article is to assess its empirical evidence in Italy for the period 1960-2008. 
After a brief introduction, an essential survey of the economic literature on this issue is offered, before 
evaluating the specifications of “Wagner’s Law” due either to Ram or Koop & Poirier. Wagner’s 
original specification is also evaluated. A few notes on the expenditure policy in Italy conclude the 
paper. 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction; 2. Wagner’s society model ; 3. A review of the results obtained; 
4. Evaluations for Italy; 5. Conclusions. 
KEYWORDS: public expenditure; Wagner’s Law; structural reforms; Italian public finance; 
time-series. 
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1 See: MYRDAL G. K., The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, Routledge & Kegan, 
London, 1953, p. VIII. 
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1. – Introduction 
HE PURPOSE OF THIS ESSAY IS TO ASSESS “WAGNER’S LAW”, ONE OF THE 
first and best known models of the dynamics of public spending. In his 
opinion the incidence of the latter on national income is set to increase over 
time. As far as the Italian case is concerned2, this occurred from the beginning of 
the Sixties (when “first centre-left” governments started) up to 20083. The data used 
is taken from the AMECO data-set of the European Commission4. 
A synthesis of the literature that, over the years, has taken shape on the model 
initially proposed by A. H. WAGNER at the end of the 19th century is followed by an 
overview of different econometric specifications of “WAGNER’s Law” and a 
discussion on the various methods used by scholars in their empirical analyses are 
discussed. 
Subsequently, we have assessed these relationships with a different specification 
that could isolate the price effect, considering such independent variables as the 
real GDP calculated at market prices and market prices GDP deflator. 
The results of the estimates regarding policy changes are commented with 
methodological caution, derived from the “error theory”5, in order to select those 
appropriate for the requalification and the reduction of Italian public spending, in 
line with the conclusions of the Libro Verde sulla spesa pubblica and (with the findings) 
of a number of researchers6. However, we are unable to comment on the inevitable 
and irreducible presence of value judgments in the modelling of the theory. 
 
2. – Wagner’s society model 
As the NITTI7, MUSGRAVE and ROSTOW8 models, also WAGNER’s model too may 
be included among the “society models”. 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of different models, applied to other data-set, see MAGAZZINO C., Modelli 
interpretativi della dinamica della spesa pubblica e “curva di Armey”: il caso italiano, 1862-2001, in “Notizie di 
Politeia”, a. XXIV, no. 92, 2008, pp. 45-60. 
3 The econometric software used is STATA 11. See web address: http://www.stata.com/. 
4 See: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8646_en.htm. 
5 See: ROMAGNOLI G. C., L’errore nelle scelte di macroeconomia, in “Rivista della Scuola superiore 
dell’economia e delle finanze”, No. 12, 2005, pp. 96-151, in part. pp. 96-99. 
6 See: MINISTERO DELL’ECONOMIA E DELLE FINANZE – COMMISSIONE TECNICA PER LA 
FINANZA PUBBLICA, Libro verde sulla spesa pubblica, typewritten, Rome, 2007. 
7 See: NITTI F. S., La scienza delle finanze, in FORTE F. (EDITED BY), Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di 
Nitti, Laterza, Bari, 1972. 
8 See: ROSTOW W. W., Politics and the Stages of Growth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971; 
MUSGRAVE R. A., Fiscal Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969; MUSGRAVE R. A. – 
PEACOCK A. T., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Macmillan, London, 1967. 
T 
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We owe to ADOLF H. WAGNER – a German economist of the second half of the 
19th century (a “socialist of the chair”) – the first theory on the increase of public 
expenditure9. This theory proposed by WAGNER is a “society theory” that therefore 
makes the growth of public expenditure dependent upon the structural evolution of 
society10. He examined the existence of a desirable limit to the size of the public 
sector, determining that a limit was in fact not possible. In his opinion, the 
development of spending is determined, essentially, by the increase of national 
income. An increase of this variable generates a more than proportional expansion 
of the public sector. It follows that what WAGNER defined as “the law of increasing 
expansion of the public sector”11, arguing, in his final analysis, that the value of 
financial pressure would increase. 
At the core of WAGNER’s thesis is, predominantly, the interaction existing 
between the growth of the public sector and that of private activities. With the 
increase of economic development, exchanges intensify among operators and the 
network of relationships becomes more and more complicated and controversial. 
All this can be addressed through legislation and arrangement of new and heftier 
controls. Moreover, since the processes of industrialization and urbanization create 
external diseconomies – such as the congestion effect or the deterioration of the 
environment –, the public sector has been called to find a remedy to these 
challenges12. 
In contrast, satisfaction of higher needs would be the explanation for the growth 
of social services. Insofar as the elasticity of such common consumptions with 
regard to income results to be superior to the unit. A continuous expansion of social 
services is easily foreseeable and, since citizens are ready towards financing such 
services with increasing shares of their resources, it would be senseless to set limits 
to these consumptions13. Consequently, there is a limit to public sector growth. By 
that, a planned level of public expenditure (and a consequent determinate 
relationship between these and the national income) beyond which the community 
would not agree to give up increasing shares for private spending. Having reached 
this point, public spending should become fixed on a proportionally constant share 
of the general economic activity. It is possible, therefore, to highlight two distinct 
periods of development of expenditure. The first is distinguished by progressive 
growth, in which the percentage variation of public expenditure turns out to be 
                                                 
9 See: WAGNER A. H., Finanzwissenschaft, Leipzig, 1883, cited in MUSGRAVE R. A. – PEACOCK A. T., 
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Macmillan, London, 1967; WAGNER A. H., Les fondements de 
l’économie politique, in 5 vol., Girard&Brière, Paris, 1912, vol. III, pp. 376-401; CHRYSTAL A. – ALT J., 
Endogenous Government Behaviour: Wagner’s Law or Götterdämmerung?, pp. 127-137 in COOK S. T. – 
JACKSON P. M. (EDITED BY), Current Issues in Fiscal Policy, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979. 
10 See: DE ROSA F., Compendio di Economia e Finanza Pubblica, Simone, Napoli, 2005, p. 42. 
11 See: WAGNER A. H., Les fondements de…, cit. 
12 See: WAGNER A. H., Finanzwissenschaft,…, cit. 
13 See: BROSIO G. (A CURA DI), La spesa pubblica, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987, pp. 93-94; 
MASTROMATTEO G., La legge del Wagner e lo sviluppo della spesa pubblica, in “Rivista di Diritto 
Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze”, 1984; MICHAS N., Wagner’s Law of Public Expenditure: What is the 
Appropriate Measurement for a Valid Test?, in “Public Finance”, 30(1), 1975, pp. 77-85; FRANCO D., 
L’espansione della spesa pubblica in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna, 1993 p. 51. 
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greater than the percentage variation of the aggregate income. While the second 
period is distinguished by proportional growth, when the percentage variation of 
public expenditure turns out to be equal to the percentage variation of the aggregate 
income14. 
From a methodological point of view, the empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship between public income and expenditure is based on the assessment of 
the elasticity of expenditure to income. Only if such elasticity is superior to the unit 
and the coefficient sign is positive, could we then come to the conclusion that the 
link between the two variables exists and it is consistent with WAGNER’s 
hypothesis15. 
However, in the Wagnerian analysis an explicit reference to political mechanisms 
of decision was missing16. As a “socialist”, WAGNER made reference to the 
“organicistic theory of the State”. The State interprets the will of citizens, it is not a 
mere reflection of its single constituent units. It takes decisions pursuing an interest 
that by definition is general, as it results specifically from State will. Here, the 
implications of “holism” are evident, with the consequent rejection of “ethic 
individualism” as well as of the “methodological” one17. 
 
3. – A review of the results obtained 
The model proposed by WAGNER has had a great influence in literature18. Although 
it has been long the fulcrum of the theoretical elaborations on determinants on 
public expenditure, with the passing of time it has also been subjected to an 
empirical assessment by different thinkers. The results obtained are contradictory, 
since with the changing of countries and the temporal intervals considered, the data-
                                                 
14 See: SOBBRIO G., Economia del settore pubblico, Giuffrè, Milano, 1999, pp. 138-139; DOMINICK M., 
A critical appraisal of the theories of government expenditure growth, University of Stellenbosch, South 
Africa, 2002. 
15 See: FOSSATI A., Economia pubblica. Elementi per un’analisi economica dell’intervento pubblico, 
FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1999, pp. 296-299; DIBA B., A Note on Public Sector Growth: a Real Perspective, 
in “Public Finance”, Vol. 37, 1982, pp. 114-119; FOSSATI A., La spesa pubblica in Italia dal 1951 al 
1980, in “Rivista di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze”, n. 3, XL, 1981, pp. 322-375; 
JACKSON P., The Growth of the Relative Size of the Public Sector, pp. 329-354 in CURRIE D. – PETERS W., 
Contemporary Economics Analysis, vol. II, Croom Helm, London, 1980; HADJIMATHEOU G., On the 
Empirical Evidence on Government Expenditure Development, in “Public Finance”, Vol. 31, 1976, pp. 144-
148. 
16 See: BROSIO G., Economia e finanza pubblica, Carocci, Roma, 2003, pp. 272-273. 
17 See: ACOCELLA N., Fondamenti di politica economica, Carocci, Roma, 1999, pp. 40-43. 
18 See: WAGNER A. H., Les fondements de l’économie politique, in 5 voll., Girard&Brière, Paris, 1912, vol. 
III, pp. 376-401; WAGNER A. H., Finanzwissenschaft, Leipzig, 1883, cited in MUSGRAVE R. A. – 
PEACOCK A. T., Classics in the Theory of…, cit. 
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set used and of the methods applied, they lead us to conclude sometimes in favour 
of the existence of “WAGNER’s Law”, and sometimes against it. 
The elasticity of public spending concerning aggregate income has been 
calculated by GIARDA19 to be equal to 0,63, whereas BELLA and QUINTIERI20 
calculated it to be equal to 0,81. According to these scholars, it can be claimed that 
during the period 1960-1985 the income growth determined around 40% of 
expenditure increase in real terms (that is the 2,95% per year on 7,4%). In any case, 
both the estimates agree in considering that public spending does not involve 
superior goods. 
KOOP and POIRIER examine WAGNER’s hypothesis in terms of a long-term 
elasticity of the per capita government expenditure, ln(G/POP), with regard to per 
capita income, ln(GDP/POP), using a bivariate error-correction mechanism, 
corresponding to a co-integrated mechanism. Of 86 countries considered, only in 
one-third of them is WAGNER’s hypothesis supported by data. The two scholars 
conclude that their calculations are in clear contrast with “WAGNER’s Law”21. 
RAM tests the relationship, still in terms of elasticity, between the share of public 
general expenditure, ln(G/Y), and the per capita GDP, ln(PCY), by breaking the 
analysis down into two parts (time-series and cross-section)22. The analyses on the 
historical series (carried out in 115 countries, in relation to the period 1950-1980) 
show, on the one hand, the great difference of the estimates for the different 
countries. As the author points out, 
 
«[…] we could say that we could obtain almost whatever other estimation for the 
government share elasticity with regard to the per-capita GDP, or for the elasticity of the 
public expenditure with regard to aggregate GDP al PIL by selecting an “appropriate” 
country or group of countries»23. 
 
On the other hand, the differences between the various groups of countries seem 
to be modest or low; the average elasticity of the groups sometimes does differ 
according to countries analyzed, but it does so in a minor way (except for Asia). In 
particular, values systematically or clearly lower for the most developed countries do 
not seem to appear. Finally, the ratio between results in line and in contrast to 
WAGNER’s hypothesis ends up to be, approximately, 3:2. Of the 115 countries 
                                                 
19 See: GIARDA P. D., Una interpretazione della crescita della spesa pubblica in Italia: 1952-1987, in “Rivista 
Bancaria”, anno XLIV, n. 11-12, 1988, November - December. 
20 See: BELLA M. – QUINTIERI B., Crescita in disequilibrio ed espansione del settore pubblico, in “Rivista 
Internazionale di Scienze Sociali”, no 2, 1989, pp. 179-200. 
21 See: KOOP G. – POIRIER D. J., An Empirical Investigation of Wagner's Hypothesis by Using a Model 
Occurrence Framework, in “Journal of the Royal Statistical Society”, Series A, vol. 158, no. 1, 1995, pp. 
123-141. 
22 See: RAM R., Wagner's Hypothesis in Time-Series and Cross-Section Perspectives: Evidence from "Real" Data 
for 115 Countries, in “The Review of Economics and Statistics”, vol. 69, no. 2, May, 1987, pp. 194-
204; RAM R., Comparing Evidence on Wagner's Hypothesis from Conventional and 'Real' Data, in “Economic 
Letters”, 20, 1986, pp. 259-262; RAM R., Causality between Income and Government Expenditure: A Broad 
International Perspective, in “Public Finance”, 41, 1986, pp. 393-413. 
23 See: RAM R., Wagner's Hypothesis in…, cit., p. 197. 
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included in the study, 41 have an elasticity inferior to the unit; in the other 75 cases, 
the relationship is significant at the level of 5% in 54 of these. 
In the cross-section estimates, the period of reference is divided into 3 sub-
periods: 1950-1960, 1961-1970 and 1971-1980. Moreover, the sample is broken 
down into two sub-samples: D.C. (Developed Countries) and L.D.C. (Less Developed 
Countries). The results seem to reject the starting hypothesis: the elasticity of the 
expenditure share concerning the per capita GDP is negative in most cases, and the 
negative sign is significant in the full sample as well as in the sub-sample L.D.C. 
Also, the elasticity of the government expenditure concerning the GDP is inferior 
to the unit  in many cases. 
MUSGRAVE reaffirmed how the most plausible formulation of WAGNER’s model 
is in terms of a positive correlation between the share of public expenditure on 
domestic product and per capita income; in addition, he found that the cross-
section evidence for high-income countries does not confirm WAGNER’s 
hypothesis. However, the analysis of historical series shows favourable evidence in 
at least 60% of cases24. 
MUSGRAVE25, HINRICHS26 and GANDHI27, working separately, reached the 
conclusion that cross-section analyses that include both developed and under-
developed countries as well as more backward countries support WAGNER’s 
hypothesis, while samples formed only by from less developed countries do not 
support this. 
SINGH and SAHNI, studying the causality link between public expenditure and 
national income for India during the period 1950-1981, found that the effect of the 
growth of public expenditure on that of national income is relatively low if 
compared to its effect on the growth of expenditure income. The conclusions they 
reach are that public expenditure and national income are linked by a causal 
mechanism of feedback; but that the empirical evidence suggests that such a 
causality relationship is neither of a Wagnerian nor a Keynesian type28. 
KELLEY suggested how “WAGNER’s Law” must be modified in order to 
incorporate the relevant effects of demographic changes. This would result from 
from the complex interaction of economic and demographic changes that do not 
necessarily require an increase of the public sphere and of state activity29. 
FERRIS and WEST discovered that empirical evidence is unfavourable to 
“WAGNER’s Law”, using data referring to the post second world-war period30. 
                                                 
24 See: MUSGRAVE R. A., Fiscal Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969. 
25 See: MUSGRAVE R. A., Fiscal Systems..., cit., pp. 111; 116-118; 123. 
26 See: HINRICHS H. H., Determinants of Government Revenue Shares among Less-Developed Countries, in 
“Economic Journal”, 75, September, 1965, pp. 546-556. 
27 See: GANDHI V. P., Wagner's Law of Public Expenditure: Do Recent Cross-Section Studies Confirm It?, in 
“Public Finance”, 26, 1971, pp. 44-56. 
28 See: SINGH B. – SAHNI B. S., Causality Between Public Expenditure and National Income, in “The 
Review of Economics and Statistics”, vol. 66, n. 4, November, 1984, pp. 630-644. 
29 See: KELLEY A. C., Demographic Change and the Size of the Government Sector, in “Southern Economic 
Journal”, vol. 3, no. 2, October, 1976, pp. 1056-1066. 
30 See: FERRIS J. S. – WEST E. G., Testing Theories of Real Government Size: U. S. Experience, in 
“Southern Economic Journal”, vol. 62, no. 3, January, 1996, pp. 537-553. 
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HENREKSON noted how the crux of “WAGNER’s Law” originates from 
regressions to levels, invoking the “causality test” of GRANGER and NEWBOLD in 
support of theses of erroneous inferences when variables are not steady31. Indeed, 
he shown how income and the share of public expenditure on national product, – 
even if correlated – are not cointegrated, demonstrating this through the Swedish 
case in an empirical verification on data in historical series from 1861 to 1990. In 
this way, they reached the conclusion that correlations reported by other 
researchers are of “spurious” nature32. 
On the contrary OXLEY, analyzing data on Great Britain from 1870 to 1913, 
found evidence in favour of “WAGNER’s Law”, which resists and satisfies the 
causality test of GRANGER33. 
EASTERLY and REBELO find strong evidence in favour of “WAGNER’s Law” in 
the cross-section analysis relating to 115 countries (in the period 1970-1988) as 
well as in the historical one concerning 26 countries (from 1870 to 1988). The 
correlation between per capita income and dimensions of public spending is often 
found, in both kinds of econometric analyses34. 
STEIN, TALVI and GRISANTI, by comparing the countries of Latin America to 
those of OECD, showed that the role of the public operator is more extensive in 
the richest countries. In other words, those countries with a greater aggregate 
income tend to have wider public apparatus35. 
SHELTON, using a cross-country panel regressed various measures of public 
expenditure on a vector of explanatory variables through the “random effects 
method”. He underlined how the richest countries tend to have populations with a 
higher average age which would push them to spend more in the area of social 
security and of other forms of protection and public assistance. Besides calculating 
the fraction of the population above 65 years old, it should be emphasized that 
countries with a greater national income would tend to have less plethoric and 
larger state machines – which constitutes the complete opposite to what 
“WAGNER’s Law” suggests. In short, it would be the health and social expenditure 
that would “lead” the relationship between public expenditure and per capita 
income, that otherwise would not increase jointly. Another determinant of 
“WAGNER’s Law” would be the “taxation technology”, that is, the expansion of 
the public operator would be made easier by the state skilfulness in increasing the 
                                                 
31 See: GRANGER C. W. J. – NEWBOLD P., Spurious Regressions in Econometrics, in “Journal of 
Econometrics”, vol. 2, No. 1, 1974, pp. 111-120; GRANGER C. W. J., Investigating causal relations by 
econometric model and cross-spectral methods, in “Econometrica”, vol. 37, 1969, pp. 424-438. 
32 See: HENREKSON M., Wagner's Law - A Spurious Relationship?, in “Public Finance”, vol. 48, No. 2, 
1993, pp. 406-415. 
33 See: OXLEY L., Cointegration, Causality, and Wagner's Law: A Test for Britain 1870-1913, in “Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy”, vol. 41, No. 3, 1994, pp. 286-298. 
34 See: EASTERLY W. – REBELO S., Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: an Empirical Investigation, in 
“Journal of Monetary Economics”, vol. 32, 1993, pp. 417-458. 
35 See: STEIN E. – TALVI E. – GRISANTI A., Institutional arrangements and fiscal performance: the Latin 
American experience, Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, Working 
Paper No. 367, February, 1998. 
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tax revenue, which in turn depends on the tax system and its simplicity and 
efficiency36. 
 
4. – Estimates for Italy 
The estimation methods used in this work are the following: OLS Robust (Ordinary 
Least Squares), FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Squares)37, ARIMAX Robust 
(AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average with Exogenous Variables), GARCH (General 
AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedaticity)38, and GLLAMM (Generalized Linear Latent 
And Mixed Model)39. Moreover, also mixed models have been used. 
The data used in this work has been drawn from the AMECO data-set of the 
European Commission (E.C.), that can be freely consulted on the web40. AMECO 
is a macroeconomic database revised monthly by the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs. It is an essential instrument for all analyses and 
reports of the ECOFIN. Its advertising is free aimed at strengthening the 
transparency and precision of studies for which it is intended. Data can be found 
here for the E.U.-27, the Eurozone, the countries proposed as candidates for entry 
into the Euroarea and other countries forming part of the O.E.C.D.41. 
The empirical evidence concerning “WAGNER’s Law” has produced, therefore, 
contrasting results: some researchers have not found any systematic relationship 
between the share of public spending and per capita domestic product42. While, 
others have found a strong positive relationship between the two variables43. 
                                                 
36 See: SHELTON C. A., The Size and Composition of Government Expenditure, Wesleyan Economic 
Working Papers, No. 2, January, 2007. 
37 See: PRAIS S. J. – WINSTEN C. B., Trend estimators and serial correlation, Cowles Commission 
Discussion Paper, No. 383, Chicago, 1954; COCHRANE D. – ORCUTT G. H., Application of least-
squares regression to relationship containing auto correlated error terms, in “Journal of the American Statistical 
Association”, 44, 1949, pp. 32-61. 
38 For an in-depth analysis of the model employed see, among others: LÜTKEPOHL H., New 
Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, Springer-Verlag, Milano, 2005; DI FONZO T. – LISI F., 
Serie storiche economiche, Carocci, Roma, 2005; BEE DAGUM E., Analisi delle serie storiche: modellistica, 
previsione e scomposizione, Springer-Verlag, Milano, 2002; GALLO G. M. – PACINI B., Metodi quantitativi 
per i mercati finanziari, Carocci, Roma, 2002; ENGLE R. F. (EDITED BY), ARCH. Selected Readings, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 
39 See: RABE-HESKETH S. – SKRONDAL A., Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling using Stata, College 
Station, Stata Press, TX, 2005; RABE-HESKETH S. – PICKLES A. – SKRONDAL S., Generalized 
multilevel structural equation modeling, in “Psychometrika”, 69, 2004, pp. 167-190. See also website 
address: http://www.gllamm.org/models.html. 
40 See: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8646_en.htm. 
41 This concerns studies of the United States of America, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, 
Island, Mexico, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. 
42 See: LALL S., A Note on Government Expenditures in Developing Countries, in “Economic Journal”, 
June, 1969, pp. 413-417; MUSGRAVE R. A., Fiscal Systems..., cit.; Lotz J. R. – Morss E. R., A Theory of 
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Using the specification suggested by RAM44, we have subjected to empirical 
analysis – relatively to the Italian case in the period 1960-2008 – the specification 
containing as dependent variable the logarithm of the share of the total public 
spending on GDP (logSTG) and as explanatory variables the logarithm of the real 
GDP (logRGDP) and the deflator of GDP at market costs (DefGDPmktpr). 
We can thus sum up in the following formula: 
 
G/Y = f(Y) [1] 
 
where G/Y represents the expenditure share on GDP, explained according to Y, the 
real GDP (we have also included in the specification the deflator of the GDP to 
take into account the price effects). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Tax Level Determinants for Developing Countries, in “Economic Development and Cultural Change”, 
April, 1970, pp. 328-341. 
43 See: GUPTA S. P., Public Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Time-Series Analysis, in “Public 
Finance”, 1967, pp. 423-461; MARTIN A. M. – LEWIS W. A., Patterns of Public Revenue and Expenditure, 
in “The Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies”, September, 1956, pp. 203-244; 
THORN R. S., The Evolution of Public Finances During Economic Development, in “The Manchester School 
of Economics and Social Studies”, 1967, pp. 19-53; WILLIAMSON J. G., Public Expenditure and 
Revenue: An International Comparison, in “The Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies”, 
January, 1961, pp. 43-56. 
44 See: RAM R., Wagner's Hypothesis in Time-Series and Cross-Section Perspectives:…, cit.; RAM R., Comparing 
Evidence on Wagner's Hypothesis…, cit. 
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TABLE 1 – Synthesis of the estimates of “WAGNER’s model” 
according to the specification proposed by RAM (1960-2008 and 1969-1992). 
Dep. Var. 
(logSTG) 
1960-2008 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Dep. Var. 
(logSTG) 
1969-1992 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Constant -1.12238*** 
(.1197347) 
- Constant -1.917033*** 
(.1080139) 
- 
logRGDP -.1508248 
(.1030481) 
1.242802*** 
(.015911) 
logRGDP .5166583*** 
(.0621597) 
-.7157331*** 
(.0913389) 
DefGDPmktpr .0051066*** 
(.00133) 
.0051404*** 
(.0016245) 
DefGDPmktpr .0021785*** 
(.0004931) 
.012581*** 
(.0022827) 
ARIMA 
Correction 
(3,0,2) (2,0,2) ARIMA 
Correction 
(1,0,3) (1,0,3) 
ARCH 
Correction 
ARCH(1) ARCH(1) ARCH 
Correction 
- - 
N 49 50 N 24 24 
Wald χ2 24807.77 
(0.0000) 
3.51e+06 
(0.0000) 
Wald χ2 1.63e+11 
(0.0000) 
1.82e+08 
(0.0000) 
Log pseudo-
verisimilutude 
97.15728 101.5576 Log pseudo-
verisimilitude 
50.59486 44.24409 
L.B. (lags(10)) 12.849 
(0.2322) 
8.5521 
(0.5751) 
L.B. (lags(10)) 7.2786 
(0.6989) 
7.6738 
(0.6607) 
AIC -174.3146 -187.1151 AIC -85.18973 -74.48818 
BIC -155.1943 -171.8189 BIC -75.7653 -66.24181 
N.B.: all estimates are calculated using the correction for the heteroscedasticity of WHITE45. 
Levels of Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
In parenthesis, for variables, the Robust Standard Errors are reported. 
 
TABLE 1 points out, on the left, that in the “full” model only the deflator is 
statistically significant, with a coefficient equal to 0,0051 (Model 1); if we consider 
only the real income as an independent variable, it is not significant, and it assumes 
the negative sign in contrast with the theoretical hypotheses (Model 2); finally, in 
Model 3 the GDP deflator is the only explanatory variable and is not statistically 
significant. On the right side of the table we have taken into account the sub-period 
1969-1992, that is the period of absence of exactness in the management of politics 
of balance: in this case we find and empirical evidence favourable to the law, since 
the real GDP is statistically significant and has the sign (positive) expected. 
Therefore, using the specification proposed by RAM, there is empirical contradictory 
evidence concerning “WAGNER’s Law” in the Italian case. 
Using the specification suggested by KOOP and POIRIER46, we have sestimated 
the model containing as dependent variable the logarithm of the per capita public 
expenditure (logTPE/Pop) and as explanatory variables the logarithm of the real per 
capita GDP (logRGDP/Pop) and market prices GDP deflator (DefGDPmktpr). 
In formula we have: 
 
G/Pop = f(Y/Pop) [2] 
                                                 
45 See: WHITE H., A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroschedasticity, in “Econometrica”, 48, 1980, pp. 817-838. 
46 See: KOOP G. – POIRIER D. J., An Empirical Investigation of Wagner's Hypothesis…, cit. 
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where G/Pop represents the per capita public expenditure, explained as a function of 
the per capita GDP, Y/Pop (also in this case we have included in the specification 
GDP deflator in order to take into account the costs effects). 
 
TABLE 2 – Synthesis of the estimates  of “WAGNER’s model” 
according to the specification proposed by KOOP and POIRIER (1960-2008). 
Dep. Var. 
(logTPE/Pop) 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Dep. Var. 
(logRTPE/Pop) 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Contant -4.478638 
(4.880812) 
- Constant  -.6558127 
(2.980067) 
- 
logRGDP/Pop .4098301 
(.5179479) 
.8802608*** 
(.0168508) 
logRGDP/Pop 1.012319*** 
(.3135481) 
1.080824*** 
(.0122582) 
DefGDPmktpr .039764*** 
(.0050327) 
.0354639*** 
(.0025589) 
DefGDPmktpr .0065354** 
(.0031218) 
.0050328*** 
(.0016597) 
ARIMA 
Correction 
(3,0,2) (3,0,2) ARIMA 
Correction 
(3,0,2) (3,0,2) 
N 47 47 N 47 47 
Wald χ2 1.33e+10 
(0.0000) 
121264.30 
(0.0000) 
Wald χ
2
 
1.74e+11 
(0.0000) 
2.87e+14 
(0.0000) 
Log pseudo-
verisimilitude 
61.39533 60.92018 Log pseudo-
verisimilitude 
76.08616 67.45124 
L.B. (lags(10)) 1.4183 
(0.9992) 
1.7156 
(0.9981) 
L.B. (lags(10)) 9.6564 
(0.4711) 
7.3338 
(0.6936) 
AIC -104.7907 -107.8404 AIC -136.1723 -118.9025 
BIC -88.13933 -94.88932 BIC -121.3711 -104.1013 
N.B.: all estimates are calculated using the correction for the heteroscedasticity of WHITE. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
In parenthesis, for the variables , the Robust Standard Errors are reported. 
 
TABLE 2 on its left side highlights that in the “full” model the real per capita 
income does not result to be statistically significant, with a coefficient equal to 
0,4098 (Model 1); if we consider only the real per capita income as independent 
variable, it is significant, but with a negative sign in contrast with the theoretical 
hypotheses (Model 2); finally, in Model 3 the GDP deflator is the only explanatory 
variable, and it is strongly significant. On the right we can see how, instead, the real 
expenditure is explained by the real per capita GDP as well as from the GDP 
deflator. In particular, the coefficient of the real aggregate production has the 
positive sign expected and is >1 (1,0123). In conclusion, even using a specification 
proposed by KOOP and POIRIER, there is empirical contradictory evidence on 
“WAGNER’s Law” in the Italian case. 
Now we present a further specification of “WAGNER’s Law”, centred on its 
original formulation. It takes as explanatory variable the level of the nominal 
aggregate income (GDP), while the dependent variable is constituted by the total 
public expenditure at levels (TPE). 
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TABLE 3 – Summary of the estimates of “WAGNER’s model” 
according to a different specification (1960-2008). 
 ARIMA-ARCH Model FGLS Model 
Dep. Var. 
(TPE) 
(with constant) (without 
constant) 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Constant -6.017985*** 
(.6922638) 
- 16.71563 
(12.33408) 
- 
GDP .8920326*** 
(.0602222) 
.9482193 
(.0173656) 
.7303163*** 
(.0425652) 
.7472976*** 
(.0354318) 
ARIMA Correction (2,0,2) (2,0,2) - - 
ARCH Correction ARCH(1) ARCH(1) - - 
N 47 47 46 46 
Wald χ2 1633.00 
(0.0000) 
282713.96 
(0.0000) 
- - 
Log pseudo-
verisimilitude 
-179.5073 -183.9054 - - 
F - - 310.03 
(0.0000) 
444.84 
(0.0000) 
R2 - - 0.8973 0.9546 
RMSE - - 25.544 25.364 
𝝆 - - .7886803 .7918021 
L.B. (lags(10)) 27.34 
(0.0023) 
23.733 
(0.0083) 
117.83 
(0.0000) 
100.93 
(0.0000) 
AIC 375.0146 381.8108 430.6137 428.9988 
BIC 389.8158 394.7619 434.271 430.8274 
N.B.: all estimates are calculated using the correction for the heteroscedasticity of WHITE. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
In parenthesis, for the variables , the Robust Standard Errors are reported. 
 
As we can see from the left section of TABLE 3, the explanatory variable is 
statistically significant and its coefficient is <1. Excluding the constant from the 
model, the results do not change appreciably. It is important to underline that in 
both specifications, the correlogram shows how the residuals do not follow the 
“White Noise” process. Applying the FGLS method, the coefficient of the 
aggregate production measured in monetary terms remains lower than the unitary 
value but statistically significant (whether the intercept is included or excluded). The 
precision of adaptation is very high while the value of 𝜌 is close to the unit (0,79 in 
both cases). Finally, also in these two last cases, we note that the residuals do not 
follow a WN process. 
 
Now we present a further specification of “WAGNER’s model”. The explanatory 
variables are represented by the logarithm of the real aggregate income ( logRGDP) 
and by market prices GDP deflator (DefGDPmktpr), while the dependent variable 
is the total public expenditure (logTPE). 
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TABLE 4 – Synthesis of the estimates of  “WAGNER’s model” 
according to a different specification (1960-2008). 
Dep. Var. 
(logTPE) 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Dep. Var. 
(logRTPE) 
(with 
constant) 
(without 
constant) 
Constant -.3050016 
(.7709652) 
- Constant -1.520341*** 
(.4352399) 
- 
logRGDP 1.862301*** 
(.5153199) 
1.780143 
(.0939006) 
logRGDP 1.491165*** 
(.3504472) 
1.273651*** 
(.2873583) 
DefGDPmktpr .0232839*** 
(.0052672) 
.0277211 
(.0028003) 
DefGDPmktpr .000667*** 
(.0031482) 
.0012266 
(.0026365) 
ARIMA 
Correction 
(2,0,2) (2,0,1) ARIMA 
Correction 
(2,0,2) (2,0,2) 
N 47 47 N 47 47 
Wald χ2 5846.41 
(0.0000) 
9.68e+13 
(0.0000) 
Wald χ2 2188.01 
(0.0000) 
2.80e+10 
(0.0000) 
Log pseudo-
verisimilitude 
46.73279 57.01742 Log pseudo-
verisimilitude 
65.76458 62.95677 
L.B. (lags(10)) 16.164 
(0.0950) 
3.7857 
(0.9565) 
L.B. (lags(10)) 13.738 
(0.1853) 
.74345 
(1.0000) 
AIC -77.46558 -102.0348 AIC -115.5292 -111.9135 
BIC -62.6644 -90.93396 BIC -100.728 -98.9625 
N.B.: all estimates are calculated using the correction for the heteroscedasticity of WHITE. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
In parenthesis, for the variables , the Robust Standard Errors are reported. 
 
As we can note from TABLE 4, with reference to the specification with 
expenditure in nominal terms (on the left), in the “full” model both explanatory 
variables are statistically significant, with a coefficient for logRGDP equal to 1,8623 
(Model 1); however, if we use exclusively this variable as regressor, it is not 
significant, and it assumes a negative sign in contrast to the theoretical hypotheses 
(Model 2); finally, in Model 3, GDP deflator is the only explanatory variable and it is 
statistically significant. This calls into question the validity of “WAGNER’s Law” in 
the Italian case, relatively to the period 1960-2008. Considering the expenditure in 
real terms (on the right), we can note that there are no significant differences with 
regard to the previous case: both explanatory variables turn out to be statistically 
significant and assume the sign expected (positive); the increase (in absolute value) 
of the constant (that passes from -0,3050 to -1,5203) however must be noted. 
Breaking down this time-frame into sub-periods but maintaining this 
specification, we can note how in the sub-period 1970-2008, the law finds 
favourable empirical evidence both when the dependent variable is expressed in 
nominal terms and when it is expressed in real terms. Instead, in the sub-period 
1970-1992, “WAGNER’s Law” seems to be confirmed by data only when the 
dependent variable is expressed in real terms but not when it is instead expressed in 
nominal terms. In the sub-period 1992-2008, “WAGNER’s Law” finds favourable 
empirical evidence when the dependent variable is expressed in nominal terms but 
not in real terms. 
Finally, we present the estimate of “WAGNER’s Law” according to the Finite 
Mixture Model-F.M.M. model. The “mix models” are used to describe the 
distribution of statistic variables within populations composed of a number of 
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heterogenic groups. In the application contexts, one of the simplest hypothesis is to 
assume that data refer to statistical units independent of each other. However, this 
assumption is implausible in territorial analyses where a discriminating effect is 
precisely the latent effect of the environment. In order to include this latent effect, 
the classical statistical models are modified by inserting an element of interaction 
among statistical units located in nearby territorial areas. We will use such categories 
of models to highlight any structural breaks in the series of the variables, also in 
order to study the possible constancy of parameters along the whole period of 
observation47. 
 
 
 
As is clearly shown by data, the model identifies three components or year 
groupings (1960-1970, 1971-1992 and 1993-2006). For all three components the real  
GDP is statistically significant, but only for the first one is the expected sign 
(positive) assumed. Moreover, it is to be noted the extreme variability of the 
coefficient for the real GDP in the different groups (1,6644, -4,7833 and -0,9668 
respectively). On the contrary, GDP deflator has a coefficient very similar in the 
three cases, between 0,01 and 0,05. Therefore, the “structural breaks” identified 
according to “WAGNER’s Law” would have in correspondence of the years 1971 
(break of the balances of public finance; collapse of Bretton Woods system; 
strengthening of the Welfare State and reflections of the ’“hot autumn”) and 1993 
(crash of the S.M.E.; “Tangentopoli”; “Maastricht Treaty”). 
                                                 
47 See: CONWAY K. – DEB P., Is Prenatal Care Really Ineffective? Or, is the 'Devil' in the Distribution?, in 
“Journal of Health Economics”, 24, 2005, pp. 489-513; MCLACHLAN G.J. – PEEL D., Finite Mixture 
Models, John Wiley, New York, 2000; DEB P. – TRIVEDI P. K., Demand for Medical Care by the Elderly: 
A Finite Mixture Approach, in “Journal of Applied Econometrics”, 12, 1997, pp. 313-326; 
TITTERINGTON D. M. – SMITH A. F. M. – MAKOW U. E., Statistical Analysis of Finite Mixture 
Distributions, John Wiley, New York, 1985. 
                                                                              
         pi3      .106072    .045478                      .0169368    .1952073
         pi2     .6371773   .0738299                      .4843062    .7665735
         pi1     .2567507   .0675798                      .1471639    .4088234
      sigma3     .0104346   .0026064                      .0063953    .0170253
      sigma2     .1663923    .028475                      .1189776    .2327025
      sigma1     .0594717   .0107174                      .0417749    .0846653
                                                                              
   /lnsigma3    -4.562623   .2497859   -18.27   0.000    -5.052195   -4.073052
   /lnsigma2    -1.793407    .171132   -10.48   0.000     -2.12882   -1.457995
   /lnsigma1    -2.822255     .18021   -15.66   0.000     -3.17546    -2.46905
 /imlogitpi2      1.79293   .4908438     3.65   0.000     .8308933    2.754966
 /imlogitpi1      .883987   .5446048     1.62   0.105    -.1834187    1.951393
                                                                              
       _cons     4.763742   .1386575    34.36   0.000     4.491979    5.035506
PrDefGDPmk~r     .0143271   .0003781    37.89   0.000     .0135861    .0150682
   logRGDPpe    -.9667893   .2245356    -4.31   0.000    -1.406871   -.5267075
component3    
                                                                              
       _cons     2.139265   .1164498    18.37   0.000     1.911027    2.367502
PrDefGDPmk~r     .0123779   .0011909    10.39   0.000     .0100438     .014712
   logRGDPpe    -4.783274   .3395889   -14.09   0.000    -5.448856   -4.117692
component2    
                                                                              
       _cons     2.570436   .0630189    40.79   0.000     2.446921    2.693951
PrDefGDPmk~r      .046567   .0007942    58.63   0.000     .0450104    .0481236
   logRGDPpe     1.664445   .1004468    16.57   0.000     1.467573    1.861317
component1    
                                                                              
      logTPE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  5.1473022                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =    7848.35
3 component Normal regression                     Number of obs   =         47
Iteration 8088:log pseudolikelihood =  5.1473022  
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Nevertheless, we must underline how the diagnostic analysis carried out 
demonstrates contradictory evidence with regard to “WAGNER’s model”. Such 
model turns out to be, for all temporal intervals considered, mis-specified, affected 
by heteroscedasticity, a positive serial correlation in the residuals and by conditional 
autoregressive heteroscedasticity, although being the aggregate production often 
statistically significant and with the sign (positive) expected. 
 
5. – Conclusions 
In a conclusion, we can say that the analyses carried out do not fully confirm the 
validity of “WAGNER’s Law”, with regard to the Italian case for the period 1960-
2008; in fact, regressing the total public expenditure on the real GDP and on market 
prices GDP deflator, we find empirical evidence favourable to the Wagnerian 
hypothesis; using the specification suggested by RAM (with the same explanatory 
variables but with the expenditure share on GDP as variable answer) we have 
contradictory empirical evidence on “WAGNER’s Law”; and we arrive at the same 
conclusions if we use a different specification of the model, proposed by KOOP and 
POIRIER, having as dependent variable the per capita public spending and as 
explanatory variables the per capita GDP and the GDP deflator. The key point, that 
is often concealed in literature, is the incompleteness of WAGNER’s original 
specification, who claimed to explain the trend of public spending through a single 
covariate (the aggregate production). That is why the inadequacy of the model 
emerges clearly, provided that the diagnostic tests are carefully analyzed, from 
different points of view: it turns out to be affected by an absence of relevant 
explanatory variables, a strong positive serial correlation in the residuals, 
heteroschedasticity, and disturbances of ARCH(p) type. 
Besides “WAGNER’s Law”, there are other sources of pressure on spending: the 
difficult overcoming of the criterion of the “incremental budget” based on the 
concept of “historical spending” (on the basis of “WILDAVSKY’s model”), that 
prevents an effective “spending review” from being carried out and the start up of a 
more efficient criterion of a “zero based budget”, devoid of a “historical memory”48; 
the expansion of the demand for public services which is increasingly onerous, the 
aim of which is to meet the ever more complex needs with the increase of 
development (on the basis of “WAGNER’s model”); moreover, on the basis of 
“ARMEY’s curve”, it has been shown how the expenditure share that maximizes the 
                                                 
48 See: MAGAZZINO C., Stima della spesa pubblica italiana secondo i modelli di Musgrave e Rostow e di 
O’Connor, ne “Il Risparmio Review”, n. 3, 2009; MAGAZZINO C., Le determinanti della spesa pubblica in 
Italia (1980-2002), parte seconda, in “Notizie di Politeia”, a. XXII, n. 83, 2006, pp. 63-78; 
MAGAZZINO C., Le determinanti della spesa pubblica in Italia (1980-2002), in “Notizie di Politeia”, a. 
XXI, n. 79, 2005, pp. 35-44. 
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Italian economic growth is equal to 23%, greatly lower than the value that it takes on 
today (49%)49. 
This should push the Italian legislator to a wide program of requalification and 
reform of public expenditure, having as its aim the revisiting of the Italian welfare 
model, the revision of the mechanisms of public revenue, a wide plan of 
liberalization and privatization50, the reform of justice (by improving the efficiency 
of the judicial apparatus and decreasing the average length of trials), of pensions 
(increasing the retirement age for all workers, and bringing the female one in line 
with the male one; reducing the replacement rate; re-modulating the system of 
benefits and eligibility, by limiting or cutting them, and that of contributions, by 
widening them; eliminating whatever part is divided within the system and replacing 
it with those at full capitalization; introducing a multi-pillar system, of which one is 
public, another private yet compulsory, and a third one private and voluntary; in 
addition, the development of pension funds would help the growth of financial 
markets, which in turn would encourage the formation of savings and the 
accumulation of capital, by promoting, in the final analysis, the growth of the 
economy), of the labour market (increasing labour flexibility and mobility; 
introducing a mechanism of compulsory insurance with minimum cover), of fiscal 
and tax system (by simplifying and streamlining them and, if necessary, introducing 
a flat tax), of health system (introducing a mandatory insurance for basic services 
and against serious or rare illnesses; extending the systems of prevention and 
vaccination; strengthening quality and cost controls, by increasing their incentives; 
introducing performance contracts for physicians), of the Public Administration 
(strengthening the transparency and the efficiency of the bureaucracy), of the 
University and of the Research (introducing international standards in the 
assessment of academic careers; avoiding the “brain drain” phenomenon; increasing 
the net contributions of University researchers; avoiding the proliferation of 
Universities; expanding the system of scholarships for equity reasons; realizing an 
                                                 
49 See: MAGAZZINO C., Modelli interpretativi della dinamica della spesa pubblica e “curva di Armey”:…, cit. 
In the same direction the conclusions of TANZI and SCHUKNECHT run according to whom «in the 
long run the total public expenditure should be brought up to under 30% of the GDP without 
having to sacrifice the main or essential activities of the public sector and without negatively 
impacting on relevant social and economic indicators», compare TANZI V. – SCHUKNECHT L., La 
spesa pubblica nel XX secolo. Una prospettiva globale, Firenze University Press, Firenze, 2007, p. 128. 
50 See: LA SPINA A. – MAJONE G., Lo Stato regolatore, il Mulino, Bologna, 2000; ENGEL E. – FISHER 
R. – GALETOVIC A., Infrastructure Franchising and Government Guarantees, X Regional Seminar on Fiscal 
Policy, CEPAL, Chile, January, 1998; IRWIN T. – KLEIN M. – PERRY G. – THOBANI M., Managing 
Contingent Capabilities in Infrastructure Privatization, X Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy, CEPAL, 
Chile, January, 1998; P.U.M.A. – O.E.C.D., Contracting Out Government Services: Best Practice Guidelines 
and Case Studies, O.E.C.D. Occasional Paper, No. 20, 1997; HEALD D., Privately Financed Capital in 
Public Services, in “The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies”, Vol. 65, No. 5, 
December, 1997, pp. 568-598; WORLD BANK, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of 
Government Ownership, Oxford University Press – W.B., New York, 1995; KAPUR A., Airport 
Infrastructure. The Emerging Role of the Private Sector, World Bank Technical Paper, No. 313, W.B., 1995; 
WORLD BANK, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, Oxford 
University Press – W.B., New York, 1994; WORLD BANK, World Development Report, Oxford 
University Press – W.B., New York, 1994. 
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easy terms credit system for the third-level education; eliminating the sub-financing 
and the overcrowding of university institutes), of the school (enacting a vouchers 
system), of work contracts, the fiscal federalism, electoral laws for the various levels 
of government that remove the hyper-fragmentation of the Italian political system – 
will be certainly able to contribute to re-qualifying spending, emptying many 
chapters of unproductive expenditure to fill those of expenditure susceptible to 
exercising greater effects on the economic activity of the country51. For this 
purpose, serious qualitative balance policies as well as reasoned qualitative deficit 
manoeuvre would be desirable (on the basis of the alternative methods of financing 
of the public deficit and of the economic cycle), that would go hand in hand with 
the quantitative ones52. The mid-term objective to be achieved should be the return 
to the primary surplus – the principal measure for the reduction of the national 
debt/gross product ratio53 – in addition to a sustained and sustainable development. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to dwell on many asymmetries concerning 
public spending that hurt private citizens, pointed out by the “Public Choice 
School” and by the “Scuola Italiana di Scienza delle Finanze”: the opposition 
between concentrated benefits and costs which are instead spread; between visible 
advantages and invisible costs (made so by mechanisms of “fiscal illusion” – that 
hides the cost of deficit financing through the issue of bonds of public debt – and 
that of the “financial illusion” – that hides the inflationary cost (via seignorage, and 
therefore with creation of monetary means) of the financing of the public deficit54. 
Moreover, the search for consent and the maximization of votes, lead “of 
course” to the expansion of deficit and public debt: in order to increase the 
probability of (re)election, policy-makers find it much more desirable to increase 
expenditure (in order to win the votes of specific electoral constituencies) instead of 
cutting them; as such, it is undoubtedly easier to operate fiscal cuttings as opposed 
                                                 
51 See: DE IOANNA P. – GORETTI C., La decisione di bilancio in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna, 2008; 
REVIGLIO F., La spesa pubblica, Marsilio, Venezia, 2007, pp. 57-74; 165-231; CIOCCA P., Ricchi per 
sempre? Una storia economica d’Italia (1796-2005), Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2007; AA. VV., Riforme. 
We will, Marsilio, Venezia, 2007; REVIGLIO F., Per restare in Europa, U.T.E.T., Torino, 2006, pp.184-
208; FAINI R. – GIANNINI S. – GROS D. – PISAURO G. – KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA F., I conti a 
rischio. La vulnerabilità della finanza pubblica italiana, il Mulino, Bologna, 2006; ALESINA A. – GIAVAZZI 
F., Goodbye Europa. Cronache di un declino economico e politico, Rizzoli, Milano, 2006; ALVI G., Una 
repubblica fondata sulle rendite. Come sono cambiati il lavoro e la ricchezza degli italiani, Mondadori, Milano, 
2006; PETRINI R., L’imbroglio fiscale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005; MINISTERO DELL’ECONOMIA E 
DELLE FINANZE – COMMISSIONE TECNICA PER LA FINANZA PUBBLICA, Libro verde sulla spesa 
pubblica…, cit., pp. 107-116. 
52 See: MARZANO A., Politica macroeconomica, U.T.E.T., Torino, 2006, pp. 204-259. 
53 See: ROMAGNOLI G. C., La Legge finanziaria 2008 tra esigenze di risanamento ed esigenze del governo, pp. 
45-68 in TRUPIANO G. (EDITED BY), La Legge finanziaria 2008, Aracne, Roma, 2008. 
54 See: PERSSON T. – TABELLINI G., Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy, M.I.T. Press, 
Cambridge-London, 2000; PERSSON T. – TABELLINI G., The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative 
Politics with Rational Politicians, in “European Economic Review”, vol. 43, 1999, pp. 699-735; 
KYDLAND F. E. – PRESCOTT E. C., The Econometrics of the General Equilibrium Approach to Business 
Cycles, in “Scandinavian Journal of Economics”, no. 93, 1991, pp. 161-178; PERSSON T. – 
TABELLINI G., Politica macroeconomica. Le nuove teorie, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, Roma, 1996 
(original edition: Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, Harwood Academic Publishers, London, 
1990). 
 - 18 - 
to a worsening in tax. This could lead to the adoption of “constitutional rules” – in 
collusion with the “New Constitutional Economics” – that could limit the discretion 
of the political class, directing the measures adopted by the latter more and more 
towards general interests of the community55. For this reason, important 
requirements for the efficiency of expenditure plans and the control of public deficit 
have been identified in balance procedures that could, one the one hand, strengthen 
incentives to cautious fiscal policies and, on the other, set rules and limits to 
expansive policies 56. 
On account of this we could reconsider the idea suggested by FORTE in the 
Eighties that is to link the actual public spending to the dynamic of prices (linking 
them to inflation rate), while those in public investments and fiscal incomes would 
be linked to the growth rate of aggregate production: the result would be a 
progressive reduction of the balance deficit57. 
Finally, it must be taken into due account how a reduction of expenditure would 
favour the contextual decrease of the fiscal pressure without worsening the 
condition of public accounts; in other words, it would allow the balancing of the 
budget, if fiscal cuts were more contained than those applied to expenditure. 
Concluding the Meeting of the “Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica” 
(Conference of the Italian Society of Public Economics) in 1978, SERGIO STEVE 
recalled: 
 
«public expenditure can appropriately grow on condition that the community is willing to 
pay its cost. 
[…] everyone agrees that public expenditure on the whole is too great, consent on this is 
easy, but no one agrees on the first public expenditure that needs to be cut»58. 
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